International Space Station overview

• Development
• Russian segment
• Modules in orbit
• Photo gallery

Since the deorbiting of Mir in 2001, Russia’s sole manned spaceflight involvement has been with the International Space Station.

Development

The International Space Station is essentially two stations in one. The Russian segment is self-contained; it was originally intended for the Mir-2 station, the successor to the first Mir, but because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and consequent drastic cutbacks to the Russian space program, Mir-2 never came to be. NASA had been trying to get its own space station, pointedly named Freedom, on which had been spent some $8 billion over 8 years up to 1991 without ever leaving the drawing-board, and this project was in danger of cancellation.

The joint ISS project was officially signed on 5 September 1993. The space programs of Russia and America essentially became integrated after the agreement was signed; not without controversy and some acrimony, but the benefits of co-operation outweighed the disadvantages. NASA needed Russia’s expertise in long-term spaceflight; the Russian space program received much-needed cash payments for the services they provided.

The ISS has generated some fierce criticism, many seeing the whole program as a waste of taxpayers’ money that could be better spent on other things. The initial enthusiasm of the partners at the official signing on 5 September 1993 has waned somewhat as the Station’s cost increased.

Russia has been the main source of criticism for the delays in the construction of the ISS. An extract from Russia in Space: the failed frontier? by Brian Harvey (2001, Springer-Praxis Books):

For Russia, the ISS was, initially at least, a mixed blessing. On the positive side, it offered an opportunity whereby Russia could continue to maintain its commitment to keeping cosmonauts in space. Without the ISS it is very doubtful if Russia could have afforded on its own to launch the Mir-2 space station, man it and resupply it. American cash provided a means whereby Mir-2 could be kitted out, the FGB built and the production line for the Soyuz and Progress kept open.

On the other hand, there was a debit side to the space station. Financial dependence on the United States for funding at key points created an unhealthy relationship in which Russia came to see itself, and was seen internationally, as the junior partner. Indeed, the ISS came to be projected in some of the Western media as an American project in which the Russians were either minor players or were being given a minimal role out of charity. American financial dominance meant that money talked whenever there were, as indeed there were, arguments about such matters as crew composition and the measurement system to be used during the program (metric or imperial). This did less than justice to the enormous legacy of orbital construction which the Russians were bringing to the project, the very real and tough level of Russian financial investment (€10bn over its 12-year base lifetime) and the considerable number of launches and resupply missions to which the Russians were committed. The ISS was heavily dependent on Russian expertise, its three large modules (Zarya, Zvezda and the Universal Docking Module) and the fact that it was providing an average of half the permanent crew, either two or three cosmonauts at any given time. Although the Russians had no option but to participate in the ISS in 1993, it was often forgotten that the Americans had been equally obliged to do so, for political support for an independent, go-it-alone American station had ebbed equally by the same time.

Some American comment on the Russian commitment to the ISS has been harsh to the point of unfairness. It has frequently been implied that the Russian commitment has depended exclusively on American financing and that Russia has put none of its own resources into the project. This is not true. In 1997, for example, R1.8 trillion out of the space budget of R5.1 trillion requested was for the ISS. Of the $21bn assembly costs (not the total cost) of the ISS for 1991-2005, $13bn is borne by the United States, Russia is paying $2.51bn, Europe $2.46bn, Japan $2.36bn, and Canada $68m. The Russian contribution is small compared to the United States, but it is nonetheless the second-largest.

Initial software problems with the U.S. elements of the ISS also caused some delays.

The International Space Station underwent quite a few changes since its original inception in 1993. The aforementioned delays and cost overruns saw the original ambitious design scaled-down somewhat, and there are no guarantees that all components will yet make it into orbit as the Shuttle flights to take these up have been drastically reduced. Various modules were deleted from the plan as delays stretched out over years; the 2003 Shuttle Columbia disaster and subsequent Return-to-Flight delays particularly affected the pace of ISS construction. The Shuttle, which carries up many of the large components, is due to retire in 2010.

Despite all the setbacks, the program seems to have a life of its own and is still plugging along in a determined, if limited, fashion. So much time, money and energy has been invested in the ISS by all partners that it would be a tremendous waste to cancel the ISS now. Also, aside from China’s fledgling solo program, the ISS is the only manned space program we still have. There are all sorts of plans and schemes for the future, such as the NASA “Vision for Exploration” announced by President George W. Bush in January 2004, committing his country to return to the Moon and go to Mars, and Russia has its own future plans for a new spaceship and missions to other planets, but the ISS is the only reality for the moment.

The lifetime of the ISS is nominally for 15 years, but given all the billions spent on it already, it is not unlikely that this may be extended for a few more beyond that, barring any disasters.

The countries involved in the ISS are Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.

…Some call [the ISS] a massive ego trip on the part of the Americans, who were furious that the Russians had the first space station, Mir.

– Caroline Green, “Last in space”

Russian segment

The final configuration of the Russian segment is still uncertain. The next element scheduled to fly will be the Multipurpose Laboratory Module, to be launched in 2009, but any others seem in doubt. Much seems precariously reliant on foreign funding for various projects. In April 2008 the head of Energiya, Vitaly Lopota, said construction would be delayed for 5 years – from 2010 to 2015 – because of insufficient funding, and thus request the other partners to extend the ISS’s lifetime to 2020.

The following diagrams show the appearance of the Russian segment:

• 2006 – Future prospects for ISS growth (39 KB): This prospective development was presented on the Energiya page “Manned Spaceflight to be cost-efficient”. A more detailed image is in the Novosti Kosmonavtiki magazine №7, July 2006 in the article «РКК “Энергия”: Концепция развития российской пилотируемой космонавтики», “RKK Energiya’s development concept” (in Russian). This again is quite ambitious and includes the yet-to-be-developed Kliper crew transport and Parom orbital tug. Two research modules are attached to the MLM (and the four solar arrays of the NEP attached to the ends of these).
• ISS configuration 2008 (via NASASpaceflight.com forum)

Modules in orbit

Zarya Functional Cargo Block
Функционально Грузовой Блок «Заря»

The first element of the ISS to launch, its name means “Sunrise”. Zarya is a self-supporting propulsive and power module with fuel storage facilities. It gives the Service Module, Zvezda, rendezvous and docking capability. (The FGB was built by Khrunichev but financed by NASA through Boeing for $200 million. A small American flag was painted on the module as well as a Russian one.) (Zarya page →)

Zvezda Service Module
Служебный Модуль «Звезда»

The second Russian element to launch, “Star” is the core module of the Russian segment, originally intended for Mir-2. It provides living quarters and life support facilities for the crew, a docking port for the Soyuz and Progress ships and propulsive attitude control and reboost capabilites. (The main attitude control function was later taken over by the four U.S. Control Movement Gyroscopes, which provide this via electric power.) (Zvezda page →)

Pirs Docking Compartment-1
Стыковочный Отсек-1 «Пирс»

“Pier” was to have served as an interim docking and VKD (EVA) port until the launch of the second FGB or Universal Docking Module, and then it would be discarded. It now looks set to stay in orbit. Two Strela, «Стрела», (“Arrow”) cargo booms are attached to the base of Pirs for moving around cargo and cosmonauts. Pirs takes an hour and 40 minutes to depressurize, and forty minutes to repress. It has two 1-meter hatches with windows set in: hatch BL-2, БЛ-2 faces between forward and port; BL-1, БЛ-1 faces between starboard and aft. Pirs is to eventually be moved to the azimuth or top port of Zvezda’s Transfer Compartment. It was to have served as a base for the Science and Power Platform (NEP), but with the cancellation of this I don’t know what its role is. (Pirs page →)

Related page: Future ISS Russian modules

~ Page last revised: 5 June 2008

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